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Abstract 
 
The paper examines the impacts of heterogeneity in the degree of relative risk aversion 
on the balance on current account in the framework of endogenous growth, and 
concludes that, like heterogeneity in demographic changes, heterogeneity in the degree 
of relative risk aversion generates persisting current account imbalances. The imbalance 
continues permanently, but its ratio to outputs stabilizes. With evidence in many 
empirical studies that the degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is relatively higher 
than that in the U.S., the paper argues that the persisting bilateral trade deficit of the U.S. 
with Japan is partially generated by this mechanism. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The large current account deficit in the U.S. and the large current account 
surplus in Japan have continued during the past three decades. This phenomenon is 
usually explained by the intertemporal approach to the current account based on 
overlapping-generations variants of the intertemporal models. The intertemporal 
approach explains persistent current account imbalances by heterogeneous demographic 
changes. In a more rapidly aging country, e.g., Japan, current account surpluses persist. 
On the other hand, in a less rapidly aging country, e.g., the U.S. current account deficits 
persist. The basic idea behind the explanation is simple. National savings moves 
heterogeneously under the heterogeneous demographic changes while national 
investments are affected less by the heterogeneous demographic changes because they 
are determined basically by the world real interest rate, and thus the heterogeneous 
demographic changes generate heterogeneous movements of the balance on current 
account, i.e., heterogeneous movements of national savings minus national investments. 
There have been voluminous works that conduct simulations and project the impacts of 
heterogeneous demographic changes in the U.S., Japan and other countries based on the 
intertemporal approach (e.g. Kotlikoff et al., 2001; Brooks, 2003; Faruqee, 2003). Many 
of the simulations project that the current account in Japan shows surpluses for several 
decades and then will turn to persisting deficits in the near future owing to the rapid 
demographical change in Japan. 
 However, although theoretical projections based on demographic changes have 
been numerously shown, few systematic empirical examinations into the relation 
between the balance on current account and demographic changes have studied. Poterba 
(2001) is one of the few such studies and concludes that although theoretical models 
generally suggest that equilibrium returns on financial assets will vary in response to 
changes in population age structure, it is difficult to find robust evidence of such 
relationships in the time series data. In addition, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) argue that 
the conventional intertemporal approach to the current account can not explain the 
persisting large current account imbalances. These arguments suggest that the 
explanation based on heterogeneous demographic changes is still merely a theoretical 
possibility and there may be another heterogeneity that generates the persisting current 
account imbalance.  
 This paper examines heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion as an 
alternative source of persistent current account imbalances. The reason why attention is 
directed to the degree of risk aversion is firstly that in endogenous growth models the 
degree of relative risk aversion plays a crucial role for growth rates and thus its 
heterogeneity significantly complicates movements of international transactions. The 
familiar Euler condition with the Harrod neutral production function such that!
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in period t. In addition, θ is the rate of time preference, ε is the degree of relative risk 
aversion, and α is a constant. In most endogenous growth models, 
t
t
k
A  is modeled to be 
constant, and thus the growth rate of consumption becomes constant (e.g. Romer, 1990; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Jones, 2003). Hence, in endogenous growth models, the 
constant growth rate of consumption 
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value of the degree of relative risk aversion ε, and thus its heterogeneity significantly 
complicates balanced growth paths in the world of free trade. 
 The second reason why this paper directs its attention to the degree of relative 
risk aversion is because it has been reported that the degree of relative risk aversion in 
Japan is relatively higher than that in the U.S. It is another important heterogeneity than 
demographic changes between the U.S. and Japan. Szpiro’s (1986) well-known 
empirical studies on international comparison of the degree of risk aversion conclude 
that, of the nine industrialized countries studied, the Japanese have the highest degree of 
relative risk aversion, e.g. the degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is 2.76 while that 
in the U.S. is 1.19. Furthermore, it is a well-known fact that compared with the 
households in the U.S., the households in Japan invest their financial assets much less in 
risky investments, which clearly indicates that the degree of risk aversion in Japan is 
much higher than that in the U.S. (e.g., Nakagawa and Shimizu, 2000). In addition, 
heterogeneity in risk averse behavior has recently been reported from the medical or 
genetical point of view. Ono et al. (1997) and Nakamura et al. (1997) show that the 
genetic composition of the receptor for brain chemicals such as serotonin or dopamine 
differs widely among human races, and that most Japanese have inherited a certain type 
of receptor composition that produces more cautious and therefore more risk averse 
characteristics, while many Americans have inherited the other type that produces less 
risk averse characteristics. Harashima (1998) argues that the so-called “Japanese 
economic system” or “Japanese capitalism” originates in the higher degree of relative 
risk aversion in the Japanese.  
 The model in this paper indicates that heterogeneity in the degree of relative 
risk aversion can generate persistent current account imbalances. The balance on current 
account in a less risk averse country shows deficits permanently, and in reverse that in a 
more risk averse country shows surpluses permanently. Nevertheless, current account 
deficits and surpluses do not explode but the ratio of deficits or surpluses to outputs 
asymptotically approach unique finite value and stabilize in both countries. The model 
predicts that if the degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is truly relatively higher than 
that in the U.S. as many empirical studies conclude, there is a possibility that the current 
account surplus persists in Japan permanently and the current account deficit persists in 
the U.S. permanently.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a two-country endogenous 
growth model, in which international transactions are incorporated, is constructed. In 
section 3, the basic nature of the model is examined. There is a balanced growth path on 
which the limits of growth rates of consumption, capital, technology, and output are all 
equal and they are equal in both countries. In section 4, the balance of payments is 
examined based on the model. It is shown that the balance on current account in the less 
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risk averse country shows deficits permanently and vice versa. Finally, some concluding 
remarks are offered in section 6. 
 
2.  THE MODEL 
 
2.1  The base model 
 As shown in Introduction, the degree of relative risk aversion plays a crucial 
role for growth rates in most endogenous growth models. In this sense, most of the 
endogenous growth models may be used for the analysis in this paper if international 
transactions are incorporated in them. However, at the same time, they commonly have 
the problems of scale effects and/or the influence of population growth (e.g., Jones, 
1995a, b). Hence, this paper specifically uses the model shown in Harashima (2004) that 
is free from both problems (see also e.g. Jones, 1995a; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; 
Peretto and Smulders, 2002). Being free from the problems is very advantageous when 
a factor other than demographic changes is examined since we can extract the effect of 
the factor that is independent of effects of population. 
 The production function is ( )tttt LKAFY ,,= . The accumulation of capital is 
 
ttttt δKAνCYK −−−= &&                            (1) 
 
where Ct is consumption, δ  is the rate of depreciation, ( )0>ν  is a constant, and a unit 
of Kt and 
ν
1  of a unit of At are equivalent, i.e., they are produced using the same 
quantities of inputs. Every firm is identical and has the same size, and for any period,  
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where Mt is the number of firms and m and ( )1>ρ  are constants. In addition, the 
relation  
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is always kept. Equation (2) indicates that the number of population and the number of 
firms in an economy are positively related. Equations (3) and (4) indicate that returns on 
investing in Kt and investing in At for a firm are kept equal, and also that a firm that 
invents a new technology cannot obtain all the returns on investing in At. This means 
that investing in At increases Yt but returns of an individual firm that invests in At is only 
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a fraction of the increase of Yt such that ( ) ( ) ( )t
t
t
t
tρ
t νA
YmL
νA
YM ∂
∂=∂
∂ −− 1 . The reason is 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers to other firms.   
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of uncompensated knowledge spillovers: 
the first is the intra-sectoral knowledge spillover, i.e. MAR externalities, and the second 
is the inter-sectoral knowledge spillover, i.e. Jacobs externalities. The theory of MAR 
assumes that knowledge spillovers between homogenous firms work out most 
effectively and thus spillovers primarily emerge within one sector. As a result, 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers will be more active if the number of firms within 
one sector is larger. On the other hand, Jacobs (1969) argues that knowledge spillovers 
are most effective among firms that practice different activities, and thus diversification, 
i.e. variety of sectors, is important for spillovers. As a result, uncompensated knowledge 
spillovers will be more active if the number of sectors is larger in an economy. 
 If it is assumed that all the sectors have the same number of firms, an increase 
of the number of firms in an economy results in more active knowledge spillovers 
owing to either MAR externalities or Jacobs externalities. That is, if an increase of the 
number of firms in an economy is a result of an increase of the number of firms in each 
sector, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will become more active by MAR 
externalities, and if an increase of the number of firms in an economy is a result of an 
increase of the number of sectors, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will become 
more active by Jacobs externalities. In either case, an increase of the number of firms in 
an economy leads to more active uncompensated knowledge spillovers. 
 Furthermore more active uncompensated knowledge spillovers will reduce the 
returns of a firm that invests in At. 
t
t
A
Y
∂
∂  indicates the over all increase in Yt in an 
economy by an additional At, that consists of both increase in production in the firm that 
invented the new technology and increase in production in other firms that use the 
newly invented technology that the firms obtained either compensating for it to the firm 
or by uncompensated knowledge spillovers. If the number of firms becomes larger and 
thus uncompensated knowledge spillovers becomes more active, the compensated 
fraction in 
t
t
A
Y
∂
∂  that the firm can obtain will become smaller and thus the returns of the 
firm will become also smaller. Equations (3) and (4)) simply describes this mechanism. 
 The production function is specified as ( )ttαtt ,LKfAY = , where ( )10 << αα  is a 
constant. Let 
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2.2  Endogenous growth model in open economies 
 Suppose that there are only two countries in the world: country 1 and country 2. 
In both countries, the values of parameters as well as population are identical except the 
degree of relative risk aversion, and the growth rate of population is zero, i.e., 0=tn . 
The degree of relative risk aversion in country 1 is 1ε  and that in country 2 is 2ε , and 
21 εε < . Goods and services and capitals are freely traded but labor is immobilized in 
each country. The balance on current account in country 1 is tτ  and the balance on 
current account in country 2 is tτ− .The production function in country 1 is ( )tαtt kfAy ,1,1 = , and that in country 2 is ( )tαtt kfAy ,2,2 =  where yi,t and ki,t are output 
and capital per capita in country i in period t for i = 1, 2. The number of population is 
equally 
2
tL  in both countries and thus the total number of population in the world is Lt. 
The number of firms in both countries is Mt and firms operate in both countries. 
Because a balanced growth path requires Harrod neutral technological progress, the 
production functions are specified as αi,tαti,t kAy −= 1  and thus ( ) ( )2,11,, == − iLAKY αttαtiti .1  
 Because both countries are free open economies, returns on investments in both 
countries are kept equal through international arbitration such that  
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That is, an increase in At enhances outputs in both countries such that ( )
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1 As is well known, only Harrod neutral technological progress matches the stylized facts presented by 
Kaldor (1961). 
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 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s∫0  mirrors international capital 
flows owing to current account imbalances. That is, the country with current account 
surpluses invests them in the other country. Since ⎟⎟⎠
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2. Because the balance on current account mirrors international capital flows, then it is a 
function of capitals in both countries such that ( ),t,tt ,kkgτ 21= . 
 The representative household in country 1 maximizes the expected utility 
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and the representative household in country 2 maximizes the expected utility 
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where ui,t, ci,t tiA ,& are the utility function, consumption and the increase of At by R&D 
activities in country i in period t for i = 1, 2, ttt AAA ,2,1 &&& += , and E is the expectation 
operator. Equations (6) and (7) implicitly assume that at t = 0 each country does not 
have any foreign asset.  
 
3.  THE BASIC NATURE OF THE MODEL 
 
3.1  The growth rate of consumption 
 Because the production function is Harrod neutral such that αi,tαti,t kAy −= 1  
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Since the problem of scale effects in endogenous growth models is not a focal point in 
this paper, tL  is assumed to be sufficiently large for simplicity and thus ( )
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t  is satisfied hereafter in this paper.  
 Therefore, the optimization problem of country 1 can be rewritten as  
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Let Hamiltonian H1 be 
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where tλ1  is a costate variable, thus the optimality conditions for country 1 are  
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Similarly, let Hamiltonian H2 be 
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where tλ2 is a costate variable, thus the optimality conditions for country 2 are  
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Hence, by equations (8), (9) and (10), the growth rate of consumption in country 1 is 
 
( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−∂
∂−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−−− θ
k
τ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
δα
mν
α
ε
c
c
,t
t
,t
t
s
α
α
α
α
,t
,t
11
011
1
1
1 11
&       (16) 
 
and, by equations (12), (13) and (14), the growth rate of consumption in country 2 is 
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′′−= 11  and u
uc
ε ,t ′
′′−= 22 . A constant growth rate such that 
t
t
t
t
c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 && =  is 
possible if 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
+∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −− ∫∫ θδα
mν
α
εε
k
dsτ
ε
k
dsτ
εδα
mν
α α
α
,t
t
s
,t
t
s
α
α
11 12
2
0
1
1
0
2
1  
,t
t
,t
t
k
τ
ε
k
τ
ε
2
1
1
2 ∂
∂+∂
∂=                                                    (18) 
 
is satisfied. This possibility is examined in the following sections. 
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3.2  Transversality condition 
 Transversality conditions are satisfied if the following conditions are satisfied. 
 
Lemma 1: Unless 1lim
,1
,1 −<
∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,2
,2 −<
∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,1
,1 −<
∞→
t
t
t k
k& , or 1lim
,2
,2 −<
∞→
t
t
t k
k& , the 
transversality conditions (equations (11) and (15)) are satisfied if 
( ) 01lim
1
1
111
0
1
0 <
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫∫−
∞→
,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
sα
α
t k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α  and  
( ) 01lim
2
2
222
0
2
0 <
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛− ∫∫−∞→
,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
sα
α
t k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α . 
Proof: ( ) ( )
,t
,tt
,t
t
sα
α
α
α
,t
,t
k
cτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
δα
mν
α
k
k
1
1
1
01
1
1 11
+−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−−&  by equation (10). . 
On the other hand, ( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∂
∂−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−= ∫−−
,t
t
,t
t
s
α
α
α
α
,t
,t
k
τ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
δα
mν
α
λ
λ
11
01
1
1 11
&
 by 
equation (9). Here, 
( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ + ∫∫−∞→∞→
,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
sα
α
t
,t
,t
,t
,t
t k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
k
k
λ
λ
1
1
111
0
1
0
1
1
1
1 1limlim
&&
. Hence, 
unless 1lim
,1
,1 −<∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,2
,2 −<∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,1
,1 −<∞→
t
t
t k
k& , or 1lim
,2
,2 −<∞→
t
t
t k
k& , then 0lim
1
1
1
1 <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +∞→
,t
,t
,t
,t
t k
k
λ
λ &&  
if ( ) 01lim
1
1
111
0
1
0 <
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫∫−
∞→
,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
sα
α
t k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α .  Similarly, if 
( ) 01lim
2
2
222
0
2
0 <
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛− ∫∫−∞→
,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
sα
α
t k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α , 0lim
2
2
2
2 <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +∞→
,t
,t
,t
,t
t k
k
λ
λ &&  
                                                                    ■ 
 
Lemma 1 indicates that if τt is not significantly large compared with c1,t and c2,t, the 
transversality conditions are satisfied. Note that the case of 1lim
,1
,1 −<
∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,2
,2 −<
∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 
1lim
,1
,1 −<∞→
t
t
t k
k& , or 1lim
,2
,2 −<∞→
t
t
t k
k&  is extremely unusual and thus these cases are excluded 
 10
hereafter in this paper.  
 
3.3  Growth path 
 Balanced growth is the focal point for the analysis of growth path. Therefore, 
the following analyses focus on the steady state such that 
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1lim
&
∞→
, 
t
t
t c
c
,2
,2lim
&
∞→
, 
t
t
t k
k
,1
,1lim
&
∞→
, 
t
t
t k
k
,2
,2lim
&
∞→
 and 
t
t
t τ
τ&
∞→lim
 are constants. Using lemma 1, the following important nature of 
the model is proved.  
 
Lemma 2: If == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, then ==== ∞→∞→∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlimlimlim
&&&&   
∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
= ∞→∞→ t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t ds
dt
dsd
0
0
limlim τ
τ
τ
τ& . 
Proof: ( ) ( )
t
tt
t
t
t
s
t
α
α
α
α
t
t
t k
cτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
δα
mν
α
k
k
1
1
1
01
1
1 limlim11lim +−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∞→∞→
−−
∞→
∫&  and 
( ) ( )
t
tt
t
t
t
s
t
α
α
α
α
t
t
t k
cτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
δα
mν
α
k
k
2
2
2
01
2
2 limlim11lim −+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∞→∞→
−−
∞→
∫&  by equations 
(10) and (14). By equations (6) and (7), =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂=− ∫ tt s
,t
,t
,t,t τdsτk
y
cc
0
1
1
21 2  
( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫− tt sα
α
τdsτα
mν
α
0
112  because 
t
t
t
t
k
y
k
y
,2
,2
,1
,1
∂
∂=∂
∂ , tt kk ,2,1 = , tt yy ,2,1 = , tt AA 21 && =  
and ( ) αα
ti
ti α
mν
α
k
y −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=∂
∂ 1
,
, 1  for 2,1=i . Hence, if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, then 
∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
===== ∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→ t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t ds
dt
dsd
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
0
0
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlimlimlimlimlim τ
τ
τ
τ&&&&& .                   ■ 
 
Lemma 3: If and only if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, all the optimality conditions are 
satisfied at the steady state. 
Proof: By Lemma 2, if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, then Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t
== ∞→∞→
,2,1
limlim  where Ξ 
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is a constant. In addition, because 
t
t
tt
s
t
tt
s
t
s
t c
c
dsds
dt
dsd
,1
,1
00
0
limlimlim
&
∞→∞→∞→ ==
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∫∫
∫
τ
τ
τ
τ
, then 
t
t
s
t k
ds
,1
0lim
∫
∞→
τ
 
1
,1
,1
,2
0 limlim
−
∞→∞→ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛== ∫
t
t
t
t
t
s
t c
c
Ξ
k
ds &τ . Therefore, 
,t
t
t
,t
t
t
,t
t
t
,t
t
t k
τ
k
τ
k
τ
k
τ
2211
limlimlimlim ∂
∂==∂
∂= ∞→∞→∞→∞→  and 
,t
t
s
t
,t
t
s
t
,t
t
s
t
,t
t
s
t k
dsτ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
2
0
2
0
1
0
1
0 limlimlimlim ∂
∂
==∂
∂
= ∫∫∫∫ ∞→∞→∞→∞→ , and thus, 
( ) 0lim1lim
1
1
1
1
111
0
1
0 <−=
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∞→
−
∞→
∫∫
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
sα
α
t k
c
k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α  and 
( ) 0lim1lim
2
2
2
2
222
0
2
0 <−=
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛− ∞→
−
∞→
∫∫
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
sα
α
t k
c
k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α . Hence, 
by Lemma 1, the transversality conditions (equations (11) and (15)) are satisfied while 
all the other optimality conditions are satisfied. 
 On the other hand, if 
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t c
c
c
c
2
2
1
1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→ ≠ , then ∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
≠ ∞→∞→ t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t ds
dt
dsd
0
0
limlim τ
τ
τ
τ& . Thus by 
Lemma 1, for both countries to satisfy the transverality conditions, it is necessary that 
∞=∞→
,t
,t
t k
c
1
1lim  or ∞=∞→
,t
,t
t k
c
2
2lim
& , which violates equations (10) or (14). As a result, if and 
only if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, all the optimality conditions are satisfied at the 
steady state.                                                          ■ 
 
 By Lemmas, it is proved that, if all the optimality conditions are satisfied, both 
countries grow on the following balanced growth path while satisfying all the optimality 
conditions. 
 
Proposition 1: If and only if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, then 
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t k
k
c
c
c
c
1
1
2
2
1
1 limlimlim
&&&
∞→∞→∞→ ==  
==== ∞→∞→∞→∞→
t
t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t A
A
y
y
y
y
k
k &&&&
limlimlimlim
2
2
1
1
2
2 constant. 
Proof: As for ,ty1 , because αtαtt kAy −= 1,1,1 , ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= t
t
,t
,t
α
,t
t
,t AA
k
αkα
k
Ay &&& 11
1
1 1 . Because 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ,t,t
,t,t
t kαmν
α
kfmν
kfkfα
A 1
1
21
1−=′
+=  and thus because ( ) ,tt kαmν
αA 11
&&
−= , then =,ty1&  
 12
( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
t
,t
α
,t
t
,t A
k
αmν
α
α
k
Ak 1
2
1
1 1
1& , and thus ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−= t
,t
,t
,t
,t
,t
A
k
αmν
α
α
k
k
y
y 12
1
1
1
1
1
1
&& . Because 
( ) ,tt kαmν
αA 11−= , ( )[ ] ,t
,t
,t
,t
,t
,t
k
k
αα
k
k
y
y
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
&&& =+−= . Hence, by Lemma 2, == ∞→∞→
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t c
c
y
y
1
1
1
1 limlim
&&  
,t
,t
t k
k
1
1lim
&
∞→
. Because tt yy ,2,1 = , then 
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
y
y
y
y
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1 limlimlimlimlimlim
&&&&&&
∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→ ===== . 
 As for tA , by ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= t
t
,t
,t
α
,t
t
,t AA
k
αkα
k
Ay &&& 11
1
1 1  and ( ) ,tt kαmν
αA 11
&&
−= , =,ty1& !
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
t
,t
α
,t
t
t A
k
α
α
αmν
k
AA 1
2
1
1&  and thus ( )
t
t
,t
t
,t
,t
A
A
α
α
αmν
k
A
y
y &&& +−=
2
11
1 1 . Because ( ) ,tt kαmν
αA 11
&&
−= , 
then ( )
t
t
,t
,t
,t
,t
A
A
α
k
k
α
y
y &&& +−=
1
1
1
1 1 . Hence, ( )
t
t
,t
,t
,t
,t
,t
,t
A
A
α
k
k
α
k
k
y
y &&&& +−==
1
1
1
1
1
1 1  and thus 
t
t
,t
,t
A
A
k
k && =
1
1 . 
Because tt kk ,2,1 = , then 
t
t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t A
A
y
y
y
y
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c &&&&&&&
∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→ ====== limlimlimlimlimlimlim
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1 .   ■ 
 
Corollary 1: If and only if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, then == ∫
∫
∞→∞→ t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t dsτ
dt
dsτd
τ
τ
0
0
limlim
&  
======= ∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t A
A
y
y
y
y
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c &&&&&&&
limlimlimlimlimlimlim
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1 a positive constant. 
Proof: By Lemma 2, 
ds
dt
dsd
c
c
c
c
t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t ∫
∫
∞→∞→∞→∞→ ===
0
0
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlimlimlim
τ
τ
τ
τ&&& . Hence, by Proposition 
1, ========= ∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→ ∫
∫
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
tt
s
t
s
t
t
t
t A
A
y
y
y
y
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
dsτ
dt
dsτd
τ
τ &&&&&&&& limlimlimlimlimlimlimlimlim
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1
0
0
a 
positive constant.                                                      ■ 
 
Because eventually current account imbalances grow at the same rate with output, 
consumption and capital, then the ratio of the balance on current account to output do 
not explode but stabilizes as shown in the proof of Lemma 3, i.e., Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t
== ∞→∞→
,2,1
limlim . 
 Because technology will not decrease persistently, i.e., 0lim >∞→
t
t
t A
A& , then only 
the case such that === ∞→∞→∞→
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t k
k
c
c
c
c
1
1
2
2
1
1 limlimlim
&&&  0limlimlimlim
2
2
1
1
2
2 >=== ∞→∞→∞→∞→
t
t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t A
A
y
y
y
y
k
k &&&&  is 
examined hereafter in this paper. 
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3.4  Unilateral balanced growth path 
 Although the balanced growth path shown in Proposition 1 satisfies all the 
optimality conditions, the representative households in both countries may not 
necessarily behave consistently with the balanced growth path because they are 
heterogeneous. Becker (1980) shows that if households have heterogeneous rates of 
time preference, the most patient household owns all wealth if households are purely 
price takers. Ghiglino (2002) predicts that it is likely that under appropriate assumptions 
the results in Becker (1980) still hold in endogenous growth models. Farmer and Lahiri 
(2004) show that in general, balanced growth equilibria do not exist in a multi-agent 
economy except for the special case that all agents have the same constant rate of time 
preference. The similar argument may hold for the heterogeneous degrees of relative 
risk aversion.  
 
Lemma 4: If the representative household in each country sets tτ  without regarding 
the other country’s optimality conditions, then it is not possible that all the optimality 
conditions of both countries are satisfied. 
Proof: In this case, tτ  can be seen as a control variable for each country. Hence, the 
same optimality condition ( ) 11 01 =∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫−
t
t
s
α
α
τ
dsτ
δα
mν
α  is added to the optimality 
conditions of each of the two countries. Here, by Lemmas 3, if all the optimality 
conditions are satisfied, then Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t
== ∞→∞→
,2,1
limlim  and  == ∫∫ ∞→∞→
t
t
s
t
t
t
s
t k
ds
k
ds
,2
0
,1
0 limlim
ττ
 
1
,1
,1lim
−
∞→ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
t
t
t c
c
Ξ
&  where Ξ is a constant. By condition ( ) 11 01 =∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫−
t
t
s
α
α
τ
dsτ
δα
mν
α ,  
( )
t
t
t
α
α
c
c
δα
mν
α
,1
,11 lim1
&
∞→
− =−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ . Hence, ( ) =
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∂
∂−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫−
∞→
t
t
t
t
s
α
α
t k
τ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
,1,1
011lim  
0limlim
1
1
1
1
1 =−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
∞→∞→ Ξc
c
Ξ
c
c
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
&& . Therefore, ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= −−
∞→ 1
1
,1
,1 1lim θδα
mν
α
ε
c
c α
α
t
t
t
&  and 
( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= −−
∞→ 2
1
,2
,2 1lim θδα
mν
α
ε
c
c α
α
t
t
t
& . Thereby 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→ > , which contradicts 
the conditions == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant shown in Lemma 3.                   ■ 
 
The proof of Lemma 4 indicates that country 1 can satisfy all its optimality conditions 
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only if either 
t
t
tt
s
t
s
t
t
t
t c
c
ds
dt
dsd
,1
,1
0
0
limlimlim
&&
∞→∞→∞→ =
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
= ∫
∫
τ
τ
τ
τ  or 
∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
= ∞→∞→ t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t ds
dt
dsd
0
0
limlim τ
τ
τ
τ&  
( ) δα
mν
α α
α
−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= −11  because 
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1lim
&
∞→
 can be constant only in both cases. The former 
case corresponds to the case Proposition 1 shows (hereafter called a “multilateral 
balanced growth path”), and both countries can satisfy all the optimality conditions. On 
the other hand, in the latter case, although country 1 can achieve all its optimality 
conditions, country 2 cannot (hereafter called a “unilateral balanced growth path”). In 
this case, 
∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
=≠ ∞→∞→∞→ t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
t
t
t ds
dt
dsd
c
c
0
0
,1
,1 limlimlim τ
τ
τ
τ&&  and 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→ > . Here, by equations 
(6) and (7), =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂=− ∫ tt s
,t
,t
,t,t τdsτk
y
cc
0
1
1
21 2 ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫− tt sα
α
τdsτα
mν
α
0
112 , and thus a 
unilateral balanced growth path requires ( ) 0lim 21 =−∞→ ,t,tt cc  because =∫∞→ t s
t
t ds
0
lim τ
τ  
( ) δα
mν
α α
α
−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −11 . However, because 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→ > , then country 2 must initially 
sets consumption such that ∞=02 ,c  that violates the optimality condition of country 2. 
Therefore, unlike multilateral balanced growth path, country 2 cannot satisfy all its 
optimal conditions even though country 1 can. 
 How should country 2 respond to the unilateral balanced growth path of 
country 1? Possibly, both countries negotiate for the trade between them, and some 
agreements may be reached. Nevertheless, if no agreement is reached and country 1 
never regards the country 2’s optimality conditions, country 2, in general, will fall into 
the following uncomfortable situation.  
 
Remark 1: If the representative household in country 1 does not regard the country 2’s 
optimality conditions, all capitals in country 2 will be eventually owned by country 1.  
 
The reason for Remark 1 is as follows. Suppose first that country 1 chooses the 
unilateral balanced growth path and sets c1,0 so as to achieve this path. There are two 
options for country 2. The first option is that country 2 also pursues its own optimality 
without regarding country 1, i.e., chooses its own unilateral balanced growth path. The 
second option is to adapt to the behavior of country 1 as a follower. If country 2 takes 
the first option, it sets c2,0 without regarding c1,0 like country 1. As Lemma 4 indicates, 
unilaterally optimal growth rates are different between the two countries and 
t
t
t
t
c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 && > , 
and thus initial consumptions are set as 0,20,1 cc < . Because ( ) ( )
t
,t,t
,t
,t
A
yy
mν
k
y
∂
+∂=∂
∂ − 211
1
1 2  
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,t
,t
k
y
2
2
∂
∂=  and tt kk ,2,1 =  must be kept, capitals and technology are equal and grow at the 
same rate in both countries. Hence, because 0,20,1 cc < , more capitals are initially 
produced in country 1 than country 2 and thus some of them need be exported to 
country 2. As a result, 
t
t
,t
,t
,t
,t
t
t
c
c
k
k
k
k
c
c
,2
,2
2
2
1
1
,1
,1 &&&& >=> , which means that each of both countries 
equally cannot satisfy all its own optimality conditions. Because 
,t
,t
t
t
t
t k
k
c
c
1
1
,1
,1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→ >  
t
t
t
,t
,t
t c
c
k
k
,2
,2
2
2 limlim
&&
∞→∞→ >= , capital soon becomes abundant in country 2, and thus unutilized 
goods and services are produced in country 2. These unutilized products are exported to 
and utilized in country 1. This process escalates as time passes because >∞→
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1lim
&  
t
t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t c
c
k
k
k
k
,2
,2
2
2
1
1 limlimlim
&&&
∞→∞→∞→ >=  and eventually almost all of consumer goods and services 
produced in country 2 are consumed by the household in country 1. This consequence 
will be uncomfortable for country 2. 
 Next, if country 2 takes the second option, country 2 should set ∞=02 ,c  to 
satisfy all its optimality conditions as Lemma 4 shows. Setting ∞=02 ,c  is impossible, 
but country 2 as a follower will initially set as large ,tc2  as possible. This action gives 
country 2 the higher expected utility than that when taking the first option because 
consumption of country 2 in this case is always higher than that when taking the first 
option. As a result, country 2 imports as large goods and services as possible from 
country 1, and the trade deficit of country 2 pile up until ( ) tt sα
α
τdsτα
mν
α =−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫− 011  is 
achieved, i.e., until 
∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
= t
s
t
s
t
t
ds
dt
dsd
0
0
τ
τ
τ
τ&  is achieved. In other words, the trade balance of 
country 2 never becomes surpluses. The current account deficits and the accumulated 
debts of country 2 to country 1 continue to increase indefinitely. Furthermore, it 
increases more rapidly than the growth rate of outputs (
t
t
t y
y
,2
,2lim
&
∞→
) because in general 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
τ
τ&&
∞→∞→ < limlim
,1
,1 , i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )21111 θθδαmν
α
ε α
α
<<
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛− − . Then, soon, all capitals in 
country 2 are owned by country 1.2 This consequence will be also uncomfortable for 
country 2. 
                                                          
2 Note that even though the households in country 2 possess no capital, the capital stock in country 2 is 
still kept to be tt kk ,1,2 =  and thus tt yy ,1,2 = . Point is that all the capital in country 2 is owned by 
foreigners. 
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 As a result, country 2 cannot satisfy all its optimality conditions in any case if 
country 1 takes a unilateral balanced growth path, and both options to counter the 
unilateral action of country 1 are uncomfortable for country 2. However, the expected 
utility of country 2 is higher if it takes the second option than the first option. Hence, 
under the circumstance that country 2 cannot satisfy all its optimality conditions in any 
case, country 2 will choose the second option that gives the higher expected utility. 
Thus, if country 1 does not regard country 2’s optimality conditions, all capitals in 
country 2 will be eventually owned by country 1. This result corresponds to the 
consequence in an economy with households that have heterogeneous rates of time 
preference shown in Becker (1980). 
 
3.5  Multilateral balanced growth path 
 Nevertheless, country 2 may refuse to trade and isolate itself if country 1 takes 
the unilateral balanced growth path Furthermore, if country 2 shows intention to isolate 
itself, country 1 may change its behavior because the isolation of country 2 is also 
uncomfortable for country 1. The isolation of country 2 indicates that country 1 must 
allocate more resources for the generation of technology, and as a result, consumption 
and the expected utility of the representative household in country 1 will decline by the 
isolation of country 2. Hence, country 1 may compromise to cooperate with country 2. 
Sorger (2002) shows that if a government levies a progressive income tax, or if there are 
few households of each type and thus they are not simple price takers but play a Nash 
equilibrium, the results shown in Becker (1980) do not hold anymore. Ghiglino (2002) 
argues that the latter case in Sorger (2002) can be interpreted as a model of international 
trade with a common market simply by associating each household’s type to a country 
with a national central planner or a representative household.  
 The above arguments suggest that it is not unnatural that the representative 
households in both countries play a Nash equilibrium with regard to the sequence of tτ . 
Lemma 3 shows that, if and only if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, all the optimality 
conditions in both countries are satisfied. Therefore, if the representative households in 
both countries behave so as to satisfy == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant at the Nash 
equilibrium, the growth path shown in Proposition 1 i.e., the multilateral balanced 
growth path, is achieved. Both countries can satisfy all the optimality conditions 
simultaneously.   
 
4.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
 
 In this section, the balance of payment when the multilateral balanced growth 
path is achieved is examined. The balance on current account shows deficits in one 
country and surpluses in the other country. The natural question is which country 
experiences deficits. As shown in the proof of Lemma 3, Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t
== ∞→∞→
,2,1
limlim  and 
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1
,1
,1
,2
0
,1
0 limlimlim
−
∞→∞→∞→ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛== ∫∫
t
t
t
t
t
s
t
t
t
s
t c
c
Ξ
k
ds
k
ds &ττ  on the multilateral balanced growth path, and 
because ki,t is positive, if the sign of Ξ is negative, the current account of economy 1 
shows deficits eventually and permanently and vice versa. On the multilateral balanced 
growth path, the value of Ξ is uniquely determined as follows. 
 
Lemma 5: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−
= −
−−
−
11
2
1
1
1
211
21
21
θδα
mν
αεε
δα
mν
α
εε
θδα
mν
α
εε
Ξ
α
α
α
α
α
α
. 
Proof: Because Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
,t
t
t
,t
t
t
=∂
∂=∂
∂
∞→∞→
21
limlim  and 
1
,1
,1
2
0
1
0 limlimlim
−
∞→∞→∞→ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=∂
∂
=∂
∂ ∫∫
t
t
t
,t
t
s
t
,t
t
s
t c
c
Ξ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ & , 
( ) ( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−=
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ + −
−
∞→
− θδα
mν
α
ε
ε
c
c
δα
mν
α
Ξ
ε
ε α
α
t
t
t
α
α
1211lim11
2
1
1
,1
,11
2
1 &  by equation 
(18), and therefore, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−
= −
∞→
−
−
1lim1
1
1
,1
,11
21
21
t
t
t
α
α
α
α
c
c
δα
mν
α
εε
θδα
mν
α
εε
Ξ
&
. By this result 
and equations (16) and (17), the limit of the growth rate is == ∞→∞→
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t c
c
c
c
2
2
1
1 limlim
&&  
( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ + −− θδα
mν
αεε α
α
1
2
1
21 . Thereby, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−
= −
−−
−
11
2
1
1
1
211
21
21
θδα
mν
αεε
δα
mν
α
εε
θδα
mν
α
εε
Ξ
α
α
α
α
α
α
.   !    ■ 
 
Hence, the value of Ξ is uniquely determined. In addition, the sign of Ξ is uniquely 
determined by the relative difference of the degree of risk aversion between country 1 
and 2 as follows.  
 
Proposition 2: If ( ) ( )
2
11 21
1
1 εεδα
mν
α
θδα
mν
α α
α
α
α +<⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−− , then 0<Ξ . 
That is, the current account deficits of country 1 continue indefinitely and vice versa. 
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Proof: ( ) 01lim
11
01 <
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∂
∂−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫−
∞→
,t
t
,t
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s
α
α
t k
τ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α  for 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→
=  by 
equations (16) and (17), and ( ) =
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
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⎪⎨
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∂
∂−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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1&  as shown in the proof of Lemma 5, then 
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−
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−
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Proposition 2 indicates the permanent current account deficits in less risk averse country 
1 and the permanent current account surpluses in more risk averse country 2. The 
condition ( ) ( )
2
11 21
1
1 εεδα
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α
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α α
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⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−  is generally satisfied 
for reasonable parameter values. Therefore, the model predicts that if the degree of 
relative risk aversion in Japan is truly relatively higher than that in the U.S. as many 
empirical studies conclude, current account surpluses continue in Japan permanently 
and current account deficits continue in the U.S. permanently. 
 On the other hand, the opposite is true for the trade balance. 
 
Corollary 2: If ( ) ( )
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. That is, the trade surpluses of country 1 continue 
indefinitely and vice versa. 
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Corollary 2 indicates the permanent trade surpluses in less risk averse country 1. That is, 
goods and services are transferred from country 1 to country 2 in each period 
indefinitely in exchange for the return to the accumulated current account deficits in 
country 1. Nevertheless, the trade balance of country 1 is not surplus from the beginning. 
Before Corollary 1 is satisfied, negative dsτ
t
s∫0  should be piled up. In the early periods 
with the small amount of dsτ
t
s∫0 , the balance on goods and services in country 1 
dsτδ
k
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t ∫⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂−
0
,2
,2  continues to be negative. That is, country 1 experiences continuous 
trade deficits for the time being, and after negative dsτ
t
s∫0  piles up sufficiently, the 
trade balance of country 1 changes to surpluses. Therefore, the model predicts that if the 
degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is truly relatively higher than that in the U.S. as 
many empirical studies conclude, trade surpluses continue in Japan and trade deficits 
continue in the U.S. for a long while, but after a sufficiently long period, the trade 
surpluses in Japan turn to deficits and the trade deficits in the U.S. turn to surpluses and 
the trade surpluses and deficits continue permanently.  
 
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 The large current account deficit of the U.S. and the large current account 
surplus of Japan have continued during the past several decades, and the large bilateral 
trade deficit of the U.S. with Japan has also persisted. The conventional intertemporal 
approach to the current account can not explain these persisting large current account 
imbalances as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) argue. This paper examines heterogeneity in 
the degree of risk aversion as an alternative source of persistent current account 
imbalances. The reason why the paper directs its attention to the degree of risk aversion 
is because in endogenous growth models the degree of relative risk aversion plays a 
crucial role for growth rates, and thus its heterogeneity significantly complicates 
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movements of international transactions. Another reason is because it has been reported 
that the degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is truly relatively higher than that in the 
U.S. as many empirical studies conclude, which implies that the large current account 
deficits in the U.S. and the large current account surpluses in Japan can be explained by 
the difference of the degree of risk aversion between Japan and the U.S.  
 The model in the paper shows that if the less risk averse country behaves 
unilaterally, all capitals in the more risk averse country are eventually owned by the less 
risk averse country. This result corresponds to the consequence of heterogeneous rates 
of time preference Becker (1980) shows. However, if both countries behave in 
multilaterally optimal ways as Sorger (2002) and Ghiglino (2002) suggest, the 
multilateral balanced growth path is achieved. On this path, heterogeneity in the degree 
of risk aversion generates persistent current account imbalances. The balance on current 
account in the less risk averse country shows deficits permanently, and in reverse 
surpluses permanently in the more risk averse country. On the other hand, the trade 
balance in the less risk averse country shows surpluses permanently and vice verse. The 
trade imbalances do not explode but the ratios of deficits or surpluses to outputs 
asymptotically approach unique finite value and stabilize eventually. Note however that 
the less risk averse country does not experience trade surpluses from the beginning. 
Initially, the trade balance of the less risk averse country shows deficits, but after its 
current account deficits pile up sufficiently, its trade balance changes to surpluses. The 
model therefore predicts that if the degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is truly 
relatively higher than that in the U.S. as many empirical studies conclude, current 
account surpluses persist in Japan and current account deficits persist in the U.S. 
permanently.  
 The mechanism of trade imbalances presented in the paper does not deny the 
possibility of trade imbalances caused by heterogeneous demographic changes. Both 
mechanisms have probably worked simultaneously. Furthermore, other heterogeneous 
parameters may play important roles for international transactions, e.g. heterogeneous 
technologies.  
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